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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                  --------
          Nos. 90-1205 and 90-6588
                  --------
          UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
90-1205              v.
KIRK FORDICE, GOVERNOR OF MISSISSIPPI, et al.

       JAKE AYERS, et al., PETITIONERS
90-6588              v.
KIRK FORDICE, GOVERNOR OF MISSISSIPPI, et al.
on writs of certiorari to the united states court of
        appeals for the fifth circuit
               [June 26, 1992]

  Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In 1954, this Court held that the concept of -`separate
but equal'- has no place in the field of public education.
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I), 347 U. S. 483, 495
(1954).  The following year, the Court ordered an end to
segregated public education -with all deliberate speed.-
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U. S. 294, 301
(1955).  Since these decisions, the Court has had many
occasions to evaluate whether a public school district has
met its affirmative obligation to dismantle its prior de jure
segregated system in elementary and secondary schools.  In
this case we decide what standards to apply in determining
whether the State of Mississippi has met this obligation in
the university context.
                      I
  Mississippi launched its public university system in 1848
by establishing the University of Mississippi, an institution
dedicated to the higher education exclusively of white
persons.  In succeeding decades, the State erected addi-
tional post-secondary, single-race educational facilities.
Alcorn State University opened its doors in 1871 as -an
agricultural college for the education of Mississippi's black
youth.-  Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1527 (ND Miss.
1987).  Creation of four more exclusively white institutions
followed: Mississippi State University (1880), Mississippi
University for Women (1885), University of Southern
Mississippi (1912), and Delta State University (1925).  The
State added two more solely black institutions in 1940 and
1950: in the former year, Jackson State University, which
was charged with training -black teachers for the black
public schools,- id., at 1528; and in the latter year, Missis-
sippi Valley State University, whose functions were to
educate teachers primarily for rural and elementary schools
and to provide vocational instruction to black students.
  Despite this Court's decisions in Brown I and Brown II,
Mississippi's policy of de jure segregation continued.  The
first black student was not admitted to the University of
Mississippi until 1962, and then only by court order.  See
Meredith v. Fair, 306 F. 2d 374 (CA5), cert. denied, 371
U. S. 828, enf'd, 313 F. 2d 532 (1962) (en banc) (per
curiam).  For the next 12 years the segregated public
university system in the State remained largely intact.
Mississippi State University, Mississippi University for
Women, University of Southern Mississippi, and Delta
State University each admitted at least one black student
during these years, but the student composition of these
institutions was still almost completely white.  During this
period, Jackson State and Mississippi Valley State were
exclusively black; Alcorn State had admitted five white
students by 1968.
  In 1969, the United States Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare (HEW) initiated efforts to enforce Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. 2000d.
HEW requested that the State devise a plan to disestablish
the formerly de jure segregated university system.  In June
1973, the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher
Learning submitted a Plan of Compliance, which expressed
the aims of improving educational opportunities for all
Mississippi citizens by setting numerical goals on the
enrollment of other-race students at State universities,
hiring other-race faculty members, and instituting remedial
programs and special recruitment efforts to achieve those
goals.  App. 898-900.  HEW rejected this Plan as failing to
comply with Title VI because it did not go far enough in the
areas of student recruitment and enrollment, faculty hiring,
elimination of unnecessary program duplication, and
institutional funding practices to ensure that -a student's
choice of institution or campus, henceforth, will be based on
other than racial criteria.-  Id., at 205.  The Board reluc-
tantly offered amendments, prefacing its reform pledge to
HEW with this statement: -With deference, it is the
position of the Board of Trustees . . . that the Mississippi
system of higher education is in compliance with Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.-  Id., at 898.  At this time, the
racial composition of the State's universities had changed
only marginally from the levels of 1968, which were almost
exclusively single-race.  Though HEW refused to accept
the modified Plan, the Board adopted it anyway.  674 F.
Supp., at 1530.  But even the limited effects of this Plan in
disestablishing the prior de jure segregated system were
substantially constricted by the state legislature, which
refused to fund it until Fiscal Year 1978, and even then at
well under half the amount sought by the Board.  App.
896-897, 1444-1445, 1448-1449.
  Private petitioners initiated this lawsuit in 1975.  They
complained that Mississippi had maintained the racially
segregative effects of its prior dual system of post-secondary
education in violation of the Fifth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, 42 U. S. C. 1981 and 1983, and
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. 2000d.
Shortly thereafter, the United States filed its complaint in
intervention, charging that State officials had failed to
satisfy their obligation under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI to dismantle
Mississippi's dual system of higher education.
  After this lawsuit was filed, the parties attempted for 12
years to achieve a consensual resolution of their differences
through voluntary dismantlement by the State of its prior
separated system.  The Board of Trustees implemented re-
views of existing curricula and program -mission- at each
institution.  In 1981, the Board issued -Mission Statements-
that identified the extant purpose of each public university.
These -missions- were clustered into three categories: com-
prehensive, urban, and regional.  -Comprehensive- universi-
ties were classified as those with the greatest existing re-
sources and program offerings.  All three such institutions
(University of Mississippi, Mississippi State, and Southern
Mississippi) were exclusively white under the prior de jure
segregated system.  The Board authorized each to continue
offering doctoral degrees and to assert leadership in certain
disciplines.  Jackson State, the sole urban university, was
assigned a more limited research and degree mission, with
both functions geared toward its urban setting.  It was ex-
clusively black at its inception.  The -regional- designation
was something of a misnomer, as the Board envisioned
those institutions primarily in an undergraduate role,
rather than a -regional- one in the geographical sense of
serving just the localities in which they were based.  Only
the universities classified as -regional- included institu-
tions that, prior to desegregation, had been either exclu-
sively white-Delta State and Mississippi University for
Women-or exclusively black-Alcorn State and Mississippi
Valley.
  By the mid-1980's, 30 years after Brown, more than 99
percent of Mississippi's white students were enrolled at
University of Mississippi, Mississippi State, Southern Mis-
sissippi, Delta State, and Mississippi University for Women.
The student bodies at these universities remained predomi-
nantly white, averaging between 80 and 91 percent white
students.  Seventy-one percent of the State's black students
attended Jackson State, Alcorn State, and Mississippi
Valley, where the racial composition ranged from 92 to 99
percent black.  Ayers v. Allain, 893 F. 2d. 732, 734-735
(CA5 1990) (panel decision).
                     II
  By 1987, the parties concluded that they could not agree
on whether the State had taken the requisite affirmative
steps to dismantle its prior de jure segregated system.
They proceeded to trial.  Both sides presented voluminous
evidence on a full range of educational issues spanning
admissions standards, faculty and administrative staff re-
cruitment, program duplication, on-campus discrimination,
institutional funding disparities, and satellite campuses.
Petitioners argued that in various ways the State continued
to reinforce historic, race-based distinctions among the
universities.  Respondents argued generally that the State
had fulfilled its duty to disestablish its state-imposed
segregative system by implementing and maintaining good-
faith, nondiscriminatory race-neutral policies and practices
in student admission, faculty hiring, and operations.  More-
over, they suggested, the State had attracted significant
numbers of qualified black students to those universities
composed mostly of white persons.  Respondents averred
that the mere continued existence of racially identifiable
universities was not unlawful given the freedom of students
to choose which institution to attend and the varying objec-
tives and features of the State's universities.
  At trial's end, based on the testimony of 71 witnesses and
56,700 pages of exhibits, the District Court entered exten-
sive findings of fact.  The court first offered a historical
overview of the higher education institutions in Mississippi
and the developments in the system between 1954 and the
filing of this suit in 1975.  674 F. Supp., at 1526-1530.  It
then made specific findings recounting post-1975 develop-
ments, including a description at the time of trial, in those
areas of the higher education system under attack by plain-
tiffs: admission requirements and recruitment; institutional
classification and assignment of missions; duplication of
programs; facilities and finance; the land grant institutions;
faculty and staff; and governance.  Id., at 1530-1550.
  The court's conclusions of law followed.  As an overview,
the court outlined the common ground in the case: -Where
a state has previously maintained a racially dual system of
public education established by law, it assumes an `affirma-
tive duty' to reform those policies and practices which re-
quired or contributed to the separation of the races.-  Id., at
1551.  Noting that courts unanimously hold that the affir-
mative duty to dismantle a racially dual structure in ele-
mentary and secondary schools also governs in the higher
education context, the court observed that there was dis-
agreement whether Green v. New Kent County School Bd.,
391 U. S. 430 (1968), applied in all of its aspects to formerly
dual systems of higher education, i.e., whether -some level
of racial mixture at previously segregated institutions of
higher learning is not only desirable but necessary to `effec-
tively' desegregate the system.-  674 F. Supp., at 1552.  Re-
lying on a Fifth Circuit three-judge court decision, Alabama
State Teachers Assn. (ASTA) v. Alabama Public School and
College Authority, 289 F. Supp. 784 (MD Ala. 1968), our per
curiam affirmance of that case, 393 U. S. 400 (1969), and
its understanding of our later decision in Bazemore v. Fri-
day, 478 U. S. 385 (1986), the court concluded that in the
higher education context, -the affirmative duty to desegre-
gate does not contemplate either restricting choice or the
achievement of any degree of racial balance.-  674 F. Supp.,
at 1553.  Thus, the court stated: -While student enrollment
and faculty and staff hiring patterns are to be examined,
greater emphasis should instead be placed on current state
higher education policies and practices in order to insure
that such policies and practices are racially neutral, de-
veloped and implemented in good faith, and do not substan-
tially contribute to the continued racial identifiability of
individual institutions.-  Id., at 1554.
  When it addressed the same aspects of the university sys-
tem covered by the fact-findings in light of the foregoing
standard, the court found no violation of federal law in any
of them.  -In summary, the court finds that current actions
on the part of the defendants demonstrate conclusively that
the defendants are fulfilling their affirmative duty to dis-
establish the former de jure segregated system of higher
education.-  Id., at 1564.
  The Court of Appeals reheard the case en banc and af-
firmed the decision of the District Court.  Ayers v. Allain,
914 F. 2d 676 (CA5 1990).  With a single exception, see
infra, at ___, it did not disturb the District Court's findings
of fact or conclusions of law.  The en banc majority agreed
that -Mississippi was . . . constitutionally required to elimi-
nate invidious racial distinctions and dismantle its dual
system.-  Id., at 682.  That duty, the court held, had been
discharged since -the record makes clear that Mississippi
has adopted and implemented race neutral policies for op-
erating its colleges and universities and that all students
have real freedom of choice to attend the college or uni-
versity they wish . . . .-  Id., at 678.
  We granted the respective writs of certiorari filed by the
United States and the private petitioners.  499 U. S. ___
(1991).
                     III
  The District Court, the Court of Appeals, and respondents
recognize and acknowledge that the State of Mississippi had
the constitutional duty to dismantle the dual school system
that its laws once mandated.  Nor is there any dispute that
this obligation applies to its higher education system.  If
the State has not discharged this duty, it remains in vio-
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Brown v. Board of
Education and its progeny clearly mandate this observation.
Thus, the primary issue in this case is whether the State
has met its affirmative duty to dismantle its prior dual
university system.
  Our decisions establish that a State does not discharge its
constitutional obligations until it eradicates policies and
practices traceable to its prior de jure dual system that
continue to foster segregation.  Thus we have consistently
asked whether existing racial identifiability is attributable
to the State, see, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U. S. ___ (1992)
(slip op., at 24); Bazemore v. Friday, supra, at 407
(White, J., concurring); Pasadena City Board of Educ. v.
Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 434 (1976); Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 417 U. S. 556, 566-567 (1974); and examined
a wide range of factors to determine whether the State has
perpetuated its formerly de jure segregation in any facet
of its institutional system.  See, e.g., Board of Education of
Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U. S. ___, ___ (slip op., at 11);
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402
U. S. 1, 18 (1971); Green v. New Kent County School Bd.,
supra, at 435-438.
  The Court of Appeals concluded that the State had ful-
filled its affirmative obligation to disestablish its prior
de jure segregated system by adopting and implementing
race-neutral policies governing its college and university
system.  Because students seeking higher education had
-real freedom- to choose the institution of their choice, the
State need do no more.  Even though neutral policies and
free choice were not enough to dismantle a dual system of
primary or secondary schools, Green v. New Kent County
School Board, supra, the Court of Appeals thought that
universities -differ in character fundamentally- from lower
levels of schools, 914 F. 2d, at 686, sufficiently so that our
decision in Bazemore v. Friday, supra, justified the conclu-
sion that the State had dismantled its former dual system.
  Like the United States, we do not disagree with the Court
of Appeals' observation that a state university system is
quite different in very relevant respects from primary and
secondary schools.  Unlike attendance at the lower level
schools, a student's decision to seek higher education has
been a matter of choice.  The State historically has not
assigned university students to a particular institution.
Moreover, like public universities throughout the country,
Mississippi's institutions of higher learning are not fungi-
ble-they have been designated to perform certain missions.
Students who qualify for admission enjoy a range of choices
of which institution to attend.  Thus, as the Court of Ap-
peals stated, -[i]t hardly needs mention that remedies
common to public school desegregation, such as pupil
assignments, busing, attendance quotas, and zoning, are
unavailable when persons may freely choose whether to
pursue an advanced education and, when the choice is
made, which of several universities to attend.-  914 F. 2d,
at 687.
  We do not agree with the Court of Appeals or the District
Court, however, that the adoption and implementation of
race-neutral policies alone suffice to demonstrate that the
State has completely abandoned its prior dual system.  That
college attendance is by choice and not by assignment does
not mean that a race-neutral admissions policy cures the
constitutional violation of a dual system.  In a system based
on choice, student attendance is determined not simply by
admissions policies, but also by many other factors.  Al-
though some of these factors clearly cannot be attributed to
State policies, many can be.  Thus, even after a State dis-
mantles its segregative admissions policy, there may still be
state action that is traceable to the State's prior de jure
segregation and that continues to foster segregation.  The
Equal Protection Clause is offended by -sophisticated as
well as simple-minded modes of discrimination.-  Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 275 (1939).  If policies traceable to
the de jure system are still in force and have discriminatory
effects, those policies too must be reformed to the extent
practicable and consistent with sound educational practices.
Freeman, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 21-22; Dowell, supra, at
___ (slip op., at 11); Green, 391 U. S., at 439; Florida ex rel.
Hawkins v. Board of Control of Fla., 350 U. S. 413, 414
(1956) (per curiam).  We also disagree with respondents
that the Court of Appeals and District Court properly relied
on our decision in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U. S. 385 (1986).
Bazemore neither requires nor justifies the conclusions
reached by the two courts below.
  Bazemore raised the issue whether the financing and op-
erational assistance provided by a state university's exten-
sion service to voluntary 4-H and Homemaker Clubs was
inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause because of
the existence of numerous all-white and all-black clubs.
Though prior to 1965 the clubs were supported on a segre-
gated basis, the District Court had found that the policy of
segregation had been completely abandoned and that no evi-
dence existed of any lingering discrimination in either
services or membership; any racial imbalance resulted from
the wholly voluntary and unfettered choice of private in-
dividuals.  Bazemore, supra, at 407 (White, J., concurring).
In this context, we held inapplicable the Green Court's judg-
ment that a voluntary choice program was insufficient to
dismantle a de jure dual system in public primary and sec-
ondary schools, but only after satisfying ourselves that the
State had not fostered segregation by playing a part in the
decision of which club an individual chose to join.
  Bazemore plainly does not excuse inquiry into whether
Mississippi has left in place certain aspects of its prior dual
system that perpetuate the racially segregated higher edu-
cation system.  If the State perpetuates policies and prac-
tices traceable to its prior system that continue to have
segregative effects-whether by influencing student enroll-
ment decisions or by fostering segregation in other facets of
the university system-and such policies are without sound
educational justification and can be practicably eliminated,
the State has not satisfied its burden of proving that it has
dismantled its prior system.  Such policies run afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause, even though the State has abol-
ished the legal requirement that whites and blacks be edu-
cated separately and has established racially neutral poli-
cies not animated by a discriminatory purpose.  Because
the standard applied by the District Court did not make
these inquiries, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the District Court's ruling that the State had
brought itself into compliance with the Equal Protection
Clause in the operation of its higher education system.
                     IV
  Had the Court of Appeals applied the correct legal stand-
ard, it would have been apparent from the undisturbed fac-
tual findings of the District Court that there are several
surviving aspects of Mississippi's prior dual system which
are constitutionally suspect; for even though such policies
may be race-neutral on their face, they substantially re-
strict a person's choice of which institution to enter and
they contribute to the racial identifiability of the eight
public universities.  Mississippi must justify these policies
or eliminate them.
  It is important to state at the outset that we make no ef-
fort to identify an exclusive list of unconstitutional rem-
nants of Mississippi's prior de jure system.  In highlighting,
as we do below, certain remnants of the prior system that
are readily apparent from the findings of fact made by the
District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we by
no means suggest that the Court of Appeals need not exam-
ine, in light of the proper standard, each of the other poli-
cies now governing the State's university system that have
been challenged or that are challenged on remand in light
of the standard that we articulate today.  With this caveat
in mind, we address four policies of the present system:
admission standards, program duplication, institutional
mission assignments, and continued operation of all eight
public universities.
  We deal first with the current admissions policies of Mis-
sissippi's public universities.  As the District Court found,
the three flagship historically white universities in the
system-University of Mississippi, Mississippi State Uni-
versity, and University of Southern Mississippi-enacted
policies in 1963 requiring all entrants to achieve a mini-
mum composite score of 15 on the American College Testing
Program (ACT).  674 F. Supp., at 1531.  The court described
the -discriminatory taint- of this policy, id., at 1557, an
obvious reference to the fact that, at the time, the average
ACT score for white students was 18 and the average score
for blacks was 7.  893 F. 2d, at 735.  The District Court
concluded, and the en banc Court of Appeals agreed, that
present admissions standards derived from policies enacted
in the 1970's to redress the problem of student unprepared-
ness.  914 F. 2d, at 679; 674 F. Supp., at 1531.  Obviously,
this mid-passage justification for perpetuating a policy en-
acted originally to discriminate against black students does
not make the present admissions standards any less consti-
tutionally suspect.
  The present admission standards are not only traceable
to the de jure system and were originally adopted for a
discriminatory purpose, but they also have present dis-
criminatory effects.  Every Mississippi resident under 21
seeking admission to the university system must take the
ACT.  Any applicant who scores at least 15 qualifies for
automatic admission to any of the five historically white
institutions except Mississippi University for Women, which
requires a score of 18 for automatic admission unless the
student has a 3.0 high school grade average.  Those scoring
less than 15 but at least 13 automatically qualify to enter
Jackson State University, Alcorn State University, and Mis-
sissippi Valley State University.  Without doubt, these re-
quirements restrict the range of choices of entering students
as to which institution they may attend in a way that per-
petuates segregation.  Those scoring 13 or 14, with some ex-
ceptions, are excluded from the five historically white uni-
versities and if they want a higher education must go to one
of the historically black institutions or attend junior college
with the hope of transferring to a historically white institu-
tion.  Proportionately more blacks than whites face this
choice: in 1985, 72 percent of Mississippi's white high school
seniors achieved an ACT composite score of 15 or better,
while less than 30 percent of black high school seniors
earned that score.  App. 1524-1525.  It is not surprising
then that Mississippi's universities remain predominantly
identifiable by race.
  The segregative effect of this automatic entrance stand-
ard is especially striking in light of the differences in mini-
mum automatic entrance scores among the regional univer-
sities in Mississippi's system.  The minimum score for auto-
matic admission to Mississippi University for Women
(MUW) is 18; it is 13 for the historically black universities.
Yet MUW is assigned the same institutional mission as two
other regional universities, Alcorn State and Mississippi
Valley-that of providing quality undergraduate education.
The effects of the policy fall disproportionately on black
students who might wish to attend MUW; and though the
disparate impact is not as great, the same is true of the
minimum standard ACT score of 15 at Delta State Univer-
sity-the other -regional- university-as compared to the
historically black -regional- universities where a score of 13
suffices for automatic admission.  The courts below made
little if any effort to justify in educational terms those
particular disparities in entrance requirements or to inquire
whether it was practicable to eliminate them.
  We also find inadequately justified by the courts below or
by the record before us the differential admissions require-
ments between universities with dissimilar programmatic
missions.  We do not suggest that absent a discriminatory
purpose different programmatic missions accompanied by
different admission standards would be constitutionally sus-
pect simply because one or more schools are racially iden-
tifiable.  But here the differential admission standards are
remnants of the dual system with a continuing discrimina-
tory effect, and the mission assignments -to some degree
follow the historical racial assignments,- 914 F. 2d, at 692.
Moreover, the District Court did not justify the differing
admission standards based on the different mission assign-
ments.  It observed only that in the 1970's, the Board of
Trustees justified a minimum ACT score of 15 because too
many students with lower scores were not prepared for the
historically white institutions and that imposing the 15
score requirement on admissions to the historically black
institutions would decimate attendance at those universi-
ties.  The District Court also stated that the mission of the
regional universities had the more modest function of pro-
viding quality undergraduate education.  Certainly the com-
prehensive universities are also, among other things, edu-
cating undergraduates.  But we think the 15 ACT test score
for automatic admission to the comprehensive universities,
as compared with a score of 13 for the regionals, requires
further justification in terms of sound educational policy.
  Another constitutionally problematic aspect of the State's
use of the ACT test scores is its policy of denying automatic
admission if an applicant fails to earn the minimum ACT
score specified for the particular institution, without also
resorting to the applicant's high school grades as an addi-
tional factor in predicting college performance.  The United
States produced evidence that the American College Testing
Program (ACTP), the administering organization of the
ACT, discourages use of ACT scores as the sole admissions
criterion on the ground that it gives an incomplete -picture-
of the student applicant's ability to perform adequately in
college.  App. 1209-1210.  One ACTP report presented into
evidence suggests that -it would be foolish- to substitute a
3- or 4-hour test in place of a student's high school grades
as a means of predicting college performance.  Id., at 193.
The record also indicated that the disparity between black
and white students' high school grade averages was much
narrower than the gap between their average ACT scores,
thereby suggesting that an admissions formula which in-
cluded grades would increase the number of black students
eligible for automatic admission to all of Mississippi's public
universities.
  The United States insists that the State's refusal to
consider information which would better predict college
performance than ACT scores alone is irrational in light of
most States' use of high school grades and other indicators
along with standardized test scores.  The District Court
observed that the Board of Trustees was concerned with
grade inflation and the lack of comparability in grading
practices and course offerings among the State's diverse
high schools.  Both the District Court and the Court of
Appeals found this concern ample justification for the fail-
ure to consider high school grade performance along with
ACT scores.  In our view, such justification is inadequate
because the ACT requirement was originally adopted for
discriminatory purposes, the current requirement is trace-
able to that decision and seemingly continues to have segre-
gative effects, and the State has so far failed to show that
the -ACT-only- admission standard is not susceptible to
elimination without eroding sound educational policy.
  A second aspect of the present system that necessitates
further inquiry is the widespread duplication of programs.
-Unnecessary- duplication refers, under the District Court's
definition, -to those instances where two or more institu-
tions offer the same nonessential or noncore program.
Under this definition, all duplication at the bachelor's level
of nonbasic liberal arts and sciences course work and all
duplication at the master's level and above are considered
to be unnecessary.-  674 F. Supp., at 1540.  The District
Court found that 34.6 percent of the 29 undergraduate
programs at historically black institutions are -unnec-
essarily duplicated- by the historically white universities,
and that 90 percent of the graduate programs at the
historically black institutions are unnecessarily duplicated
at the historically white institutions.  Id., at 1541.  In its
conclusions of law on this point, the District Court never-
theless determined that -there is no proof- that such
duplication -is directly associated with the racial identifi-
ability of institutions,- and that -there is no proof that the
elimination of unnecessary program duplication would be
justifiable from an educational standpoint or that its
elimination would have a substantial effect on student
choice.-  Id., at 1561.
  The District Court's treatment of this issue is problematic
from several different perspectives.  First, the court ap-
peared to impose the burden of proof on the plaintiffs to
meet a legal standard the court itself acknowledged was not
yet formulated.  It can hardly be denied that such duplica-
tion was part and parcel of the prior dual system of higher
education-the whole notion of -separate but equal- re-
quired duplicative programs in two sets of schools-and
that the present unnecessary duplication is a continuation
of that practice.  Brown and its progeny, however, estab-
lished that the burden of proof falls on the State, and not
the aggrieved plaintiffs, to establish that it has dismantled
its prior de jure segregated system.  Brown II, 349 U. S., at
300.  The court's holding that petitioners could not establish
the constitutional defect of unnecessary duplication, there-
fore, improperly shifted the burden away from the State.
Second, implicit in the District Court's finding of -unneces-
sary- duplication is the absence of any educational justifica-
tion and the fact that some if not all duplication may be
practicably eliminated.  Indeed, the District Court observed
that such duplication -cannot be justified economically or in
terms of providing quality education.-  674 F. Supp., at
1541.  Yet by stating that -there is no proof- that elimina-
tion of unnecessary duplication would decrease institutional
racial identifiability, affect student choice, and promote
educationally sound policies, the court did not make clear
whether it had directed the parties to develop evidence on
these points, and if so, what that evidence revealed.  See
id., at 1561.  Finally, by treating this issue in isolation,
the court failed to consider the combined effects of unneces-
sary program duplication with other policies, such as differ-
ential admissions standards, in evaluating whether the
State had met its duty to dismantle its prior de jure segre-
gated system.
  We next address Mississippi's scheme of institutional mis-
sion classification, and whether it perpetuates the State's
formerly de jure dual system.  The District Court found
that, throughout the period of de jure segregation, Univer-
sity of Mississippi, Mississippi State University, and Uni-
versity of Southern Mississippi were the flagship institu-
tions in the state system.  They received the most funds, in-
itiated the most advanced and specialized programs, and
developed the widest range of curricular functions.  At their
inception, each was restricted for the education solely of
white persons.  Id., at 1526-1528.  The missions of Missis-
sippi University for Women and Delta State University
(DSU), by contrast, were more limited than their other all-
white counterparts during the period of legalized segrega-
tion.  MUW and DSU were each established to provide un-
dergraduate education solely for white students in the
liberal arts and such other fields as music, art, education,
and home economics.  Id., at 1527-1528.  When they were
founded, the three exclusively black universities were more
limited in their assigned academic missions than the five
all-white institutions.  Alcorn State, for example, was des-
ignated to serve as -an agricultural college for the education
of Mississippi's black youth.-  Id., at 1527.  Jackson State
and Mississippi Valley State were established to train black
teachers.  Id., at 1528.  Though the District Court's findings
do not make this point explicit, it is reasonable to infer that
state funding and curriculum decisions throughout the pe-
riod of de jure segregation were based on the purposes for
which these institutions were established.
  In 1981, the State assigned certain missions to Missis-
sippi's public universities as they then existed.  It classified
University of Mississippi, Mississippi State, and Southern
Mississippi as -comprehensive- universities having the most
varied programs and offering graduate degrees.  Two of the
historically white institutions, Delta State University and
Mississippi University for Women, along with two of the
historically black institutions, Alcorn State University and
Mississippi Valley State University, were designated as -re-
gional- universities with more limited programs and de-
voted primarily to undergraduate education.  Jackson State
University was classified as an -urban- university whose
mission was defined by its urban location.
  The institutional mission designations adopted in 1981
have as their antecedents the policies enacted to perpetuate
racial separation during the de jure segregated regime.  The
Court of Appeals expressly disagreed with the District
Court by recognizing that the -inequalities among the insti-
tutions largely follow the mission designations, and the
mission designations to some degree follow the historical
racial assignments.-  914 F. 2d, at 692.  It nevertheless
upheld this facet of the system as constitutionally accept-
able based on the existence of good-faith racially neutral
policies and procedures.  That different missions are as-
signed to the universities surely limits to some extent an
entering student's choice as to which university to seek
admittance.  While the courts below both agreed that the
classification and mission assignments were made without
discriminatory purpose, the Court of Appeals found that the
record -supports the plaintiffs' argument that the mission
designations had the effect of maintaining the more limited
program scope at the historically black universities.-  Id., at
690.  We do not suggest that absent discriminatory purpose
the assignment of different missions to various institutions
in a State's higher education system would raise an equal
protection issue where one or more of the institutions be-
come or remain predominantly black or white.  But here the
issue is whether the State has sufficiently dismantled its
prior dual system; and when combined with the differential
admission practices and unnecessary program duplication,
it is likely that the mission designations interfere with
student choice and tend to perpetuate the segregated sys-
tem.  On remand, the court should inquire whether it would
be practicable and consistent with sound educational prac-
tices to eliminate any such discriminatory effects of the
State's present policy of mission assignments.
  Fourth, the State attempted to bring itself into compli-
ance with the Constitution by continuing to maintain and
operate all eight higher educational institutions.  The ex-
istence of eight instead of some lesser number was undoubt-
edly occasioned by State laws forbidding the mingling of the
races.  And as the District Court recognized, continuing to
maintain all eight universities in Mississippi is wasteful
and irrational.  The District Court pointed especially to the
facts that Delta State and Mississippi Valley are only 35
miles apart and that only 20 miles separate Mississippi
State and Mississippi University for Women.  674 F. Supp.,
at 1563-1564.  It was evident to the District Court that -the
defendants undertake to fund more institutions of higher
learning than are justified by the amount of financial
resources available to the state,- id., at 1564, but the court
concluded that such fiscal irresponsibility was a policy
choice of the legislature rather than a feature of a system
subject to constitutional scrutiny.
  Unquestionably, a larger rather than a smaller number
of institutions from which to choose in itself makes for
different choices, particularly when examined in the light
of other factors present in the operation of the system, such
as admissions, program duplication, and institutional mis-
sion designations.  Though certainly closure of one or more
institutions would decrease the discriminatory effects of the
present system, see, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 718 F.
Supp. 499, 514 (ED La. 1989), based on the present record
we are unable to say whether such action is constitutionally
required.  Elimination of program duplication and revi-
sion of admissions criteria may make institutional closure
unnecessary.  However, on remand this issue should be
carefully explored by inquiring and determining whether
retention of all eight institutions itself affects student
choice and perpetuates the segregated higher education
system, whether maintenance of each of the universities is
educationally justifiable, and whether one or more of them
can be practicably closed or merged with other existing
institutions.
  Because the former de jure segregated system of public
universities in Mississippi impeded the free choice of pro-
spective students, the State in dismantling that system
must take the necessary steps to ensure that this choice
now is truly free.  The full range of policies and practices
must be examined with this duty in mind.  That an
institution is predominantly white or black does not in itself
make out a constitutional violation.  But surely the State
may not leave in place policies rooted in its prior officially-
segregated system that serve to maintain the racial
identifiability of its universities if those policies can
practicably be eliminated without eroding sound education-
al policies.
  If we understand private petitioners to press us to order
the upgrading of Jackson State, Alcorn State, and Missis-
sippi Valley solely so that they may be publicly financed,
exclusively black enclaves by private choice, we reject that
request.  The State provides these facilities for all its citi-
zens and it has not met its burden under Brown to take af-
firmative steps to dismantle its prior de jure system when
it perpetuates a separate, but -more equal- one.  Whether
such an increase in funding is necessary to achieve a full
dismantlement under the standards we have outlined,
however, is a different question, and one that must be ad-
dressed on remand.
  Because the District Court and the Court of Appeals
failed to consider the State's duties in their proper light, the
cases must be remanded.  To the extent that the State has
not met its affirmative obligation to dismantle its prior dual
system, it shall be adjudged in violation of the Constitution
and Title VI and remedial proceedings shall be conducted.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
                            It is so ordered.